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The word “Paedophilia” has come a long way from its Greek origin of child-companionship to a Mental Disorder, Social
Taboo and Criminal Offence. Various laws are in place to help control such behaviour, protect the vulnerable and restrain
related criminal offences. However, enforcement of such laws has become a significant challenge with the advent of
social media creating a new platform for this old crime. This move necessitates consideration of approaches that are
suited to this new platform and the way in which it affects the Cycle of Entrapment. This paper reviews definitions of,
and features of, paedophilia and other related –philias, and sexual offences against children, and seeks through the
understanding of these to determine where specific detection approaches are effective. To this end, we present our
own detection approach which is geared towards predatory behaviours, which can be a precursor to sexual offences
against children, and which directly references this Cycle of Entrapment. Our approach has shown early promise with an
F1 score of 0.66 for training data but only achieving 0.48 for testing data on a collection of chat logs of sexual predators.
The results were later improved to achieve an F1 score of 0.77 for train and 0.54 for test data based on the approach.
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Paedophilia, whilst perhaps historically of little conse-
quence – perhaps even a socially acceptable form of
entertainment [1] is now variously considered a Mental
Disorder, a Social Taboo, and a Criminal Offence [2,3].
Various laws exist in various countries that aim to
control or prevent such behaviours and protect the
vulnerable. These laws rely on the ability to detect the
occurrence of such behaviours, and in recent years this
ability has been challenged by the emergence of social
media. Social media has created a new platform for an
old crime, challenging authorities in both applicability of
laws and in possibilities of crime detection.
If we go back only as far as the early 1990s, predators
who were unknown to their victims would have to ap-
proach them in real world settings, with concomitant
risks of being identified, and prevented, by eyewitnesses.
A mere 20 years on, and social media can facilitate much
more ready access with rather lesser risk of eyewitnesses.
The principal difference is one of familiarity: predators
can get to know their prey in advance of the physical* Correspondence: a.vartapetiance@surrey.ac.uk
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reproduction in any medium, provided the origapproach that was needed previously, making the ap-
proach much easier, and offering the predator the oppor-
tunity to control the surroundings of this physical
encounter - either reducing the likelihood of eyewitnesses
being present, or making the situation appears entirely nor-
mal. Further, it can be unclear whether the predator
convinces the prey to take actions based on false beliefs or
ill-perceived risks, or whether the predator is entirely open
about their intentions and the prey is merely lulled into a
false sense of security. In being able to control such situa-
tions, paedophiles, hebephiles, and others intent on com-
mission of sexual offences against children seem to have a
dangerously lessened risk of detection.
The principal aim of this paper is to present our under-
standing of paedophilia and related issues of hebephilia
and sexual offences against children, and through these to
appreciate what would be detectable in the predatory ac-
tivities as might precede these. In Background section, we
discuss the clinical and legal perspectives on these mat-
ters, and note how variation in age is a feature and that
mainstream use of such labels can be inconsistent with
such definitions. We note that predatory activities tend
to involve a degree of effort on the part of the predator,
and that the Cycle of Entrapment is where certain effortsnger. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
mmons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
inal work is properly cited.
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our discussion to the online world, noting the implications
this brings for the Cycle of Entrapment and the difficulties
of applying technological controls and also of how the blur-
ring of geographies can create issues, and ways in which
predators can use the online world. In Section Empowering
investigators, we discuss technologies that can be deployed
against such predators, as well as our own approach to de-
tection around identifying requests for information that re-
late to the Cycle of Entrapment, and briefly conclude the
paper in Section Investigating the possible gain from ma-
chine learning.
Background
In this section we offer a brief discussion of differences in
definitions as relate to clinical (paedophilia, hebephilia,
World Health Organisation and Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders) and legal (laws on sexual of-
fences) interpretation of sexual relationships with chil-
dren. This leads on to an exploration of the kinds of
predatory behaviours involved, and finally to the fea-
tures which make the online world such an appealing
place for those wishing to behave in such a way.
Paedophile, hebephile, or child sexual offender?
The word Paedophilia derives from the Greek words “child”
(παιδί/paidί) and “Friendship/ Companionship” (φιλία/phi-
lίa). But this historical derivation seems somehow inconsist-
ent with it being a disorder of sexual preference according
to the World Health Organisation (WHO) in International
Classification of Diseases (ICD-10 [4]):
A. The general criteria for F65 Disorders of sexual
preference must be met [which are outlined here]G1. Recurrent and intense sexual urges and fantasies
involving unusual objects or activities.
G2. Acts on the urges or is markedly distressed by them.
G3. The preference has been present for at least six
months
B. A persistent or a predominant preference for sexual
activity with a prepubescentaa child or children.
C. The person is at least 16 years old and at least five
years older than the child or children in B.
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV_TR [5]) relates the persistent or
predominant preference as Exclusive and Non-exclusive,
depending on whether it involves sexual relations only
with children or with adults as well [2,6]. Seto [2], p.14
further extends these to incorporate a more vivid de-
scription of the kinds of acts involved (underlined for
emphasis):“…sexual preference for prepubescentb children when
sexually mature partners are potentially available,
whether it is reflected in recurrent self-reported
thoughts, fantasies, or urges about sexual contact with
children; exhibited in greater sexual arousal to stimuli
depicting prepubescent children relative to stimuli
depicting adults; or manifested in a pattern of sexual
behaviour involving children.”This, then, seems to involve either a desire to do
something with prepubescent children, or the actual
doing of those desired things – with the former poten-
tially difficult to identify. This notion of prepubescent
seems important. However, the label “Paedophile” seems
to be used quite broadly by mainstream media, investi-
gative organizations, and other agencies, to apply to any-
one who has an interest in children (under the age of
16) or commits an offence against them. Interpreting
such definitions would seem to require clarification of
prepubescent. The age of puberty can vary from person
to person, but a recent article in a paediatric journal
suggested “patients ≦ 8years old (prepubescent), 8–13
(pubescent), 13–18 (post-pubescent)” [7]. It is possible
that these age ranges suit the country and the study, but
they appear unduly low and it may be more typical to
distinguish amongst those sexually attracted to infants
from 0-5 years, (called Nepiophilia or infantophilia),
children younger than 11 (Paedophilia, which may
incorporate Nepiophilia), ages 11–14 (Hebephilia) and
15-19 (Ephebophilia) e.g. [2,8].
It has been reported that the largest proportion of sex-
ual offenses in the US occurs against 14 year old chil-
dren (Figure 1) [9], which means these offenders are
interested in early pubescent children (recall that Hebe-
philia is 11- 14), and this may not even be considered as
a crime or disorder in some countries [8].
These labels on child-adult sexual relations at spe-
cific ages also do not necessarily cohere with national
laws. For example, in the United Kingdom, sexual rela-
tions between an adult and a 15 year old girl are crimes
according to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which
makes the key distinctions for ages at 13 and 16. An
adult that falls foul of such a law with a 15 year old girl
would, by the previous definitions, be considered nei-
ther a paedophile nor a hebephile but an ephebophile.
However, the paedophile label will still be used by
mainstream mediac. For such purposes, Lanning’s [10],
p.18 definition of Child Sexual Offender/Child Molester
seems more apt:
“… as a significantly older individual who engages in
any type of sexual activity with individuals legally
defined as children.”
Figure 1 From Snyder [9] (Figures one and six): relation between sexual offences, victims and offenders.
Table 1 Relation between different characteristics defined
for sexual offenders
Predatory activity Reference
Situational predators Preferential Predator [10]
Short term strategic
placement
Long Term Strategic
Placement
[11]
Less exclusive More exclusive [2,5,6]
Less intensity More Intensity [2,4,5]
Less persistence More Persistence [2,4,5]
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1. “Significantly Older”: Based on both DSM-IV-TR
and ICD-10, an age difference of five years or
more although this might vary in different
jurisdictions.
2. “Defined as child”: “Age of Consent” defines who
may be considered a child in a given jurisdiction.
But when sexually mature partners are potentially
available, what compels adults to become sexually inter-
ested in and involved with children? Finkelhor & Araji
[6] suggest four reasons for paedophilic behaviour.
1. Emotional congruence - the adult has an emotional
need to relate to a child
2. Sexual arousal - the adult could only become sexu-
ally aroused by a child;
3. Blockage - alternative sources of sexual and emo-
tional gratification are not actually available;
4. Disinhibition - the adult is not deterred from such
an interest by normal prohibitions.
The nature of the need, then, is likely to influence
the ways in which they seek to satisfy that need.
Offenders can be further divided based on their ap-
proach [10,11]:
 Situational or Short Term Strategic Placement: the
offender has weak motives (intensity) and might not
have acted upon it before. There are chances for it
to be accidental and opportunistic approaches (not
planned).
 Preferential or Long Term Strategic Placement: the
offender has strong intensity and persistence. The
offender would usually try to place him/herself in a
position to assure his/her access to childrenTable 1 relates the above distinctions more clearly.
However, it is important to note that such differences in
predatory activity need not be clearly fit to one column
or the other.
Relationship with victims (Children)
The relationship of a predator with a child can be either
as a stranger, an acquaintance, or a familiar, described as
follows:
Stranger: Sexual abuse of children where the person is
unknown/ not well known to the child. Most such
offenders do not have or want long term access to
children nor previously build relationships with them.
Therefore, in order to lure the children, they are more
likely to use threats and physical forces [10].
Acquaintance: Sexual abuse of children where the
person is known/ thought to be known by the child.
These offenders usually build access to children, however
they do not use violence to lure the children. They
would spend time to create the relationship both to give
them access to the child and decrease the likelihood of
disclosure. Every acquaintance offender starts from being
a “stranger” and then builds the abusing relation.
Depending on the child’s (victim’s) age, the offender
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well to gain their trust and consequently access to
the child. Lanning [10] identifies that seduction
techniques for young children revolve around fun,
games and plays while for older children it revolves
around sexual arousal, curiosity, rebelliousness and
inexperience.
Familiar: Sexual abuse of children where the person is
within close family circle; e.g. step/father, step/brother,
uncle, grandfather, female family members. These
offenders usually have long term access to the children
and they use their authority and status to control the
children. As they are part of family, some of these
relations may never be disclosed by the child.
Snyder ([9], Figure six) present the results of studies on
victim-offender relationships in sexual assaults (no age
limit) and shows that except for victims under age 6,
most sexual assault offenders were acquaintances, with
60% in general across all ages.
Table 2 summarises our understanding across different
classifications introduced in various research in regard
to the three types of relationships. Note how these in-
corporate Situational and Preferential as discussed above
and shown in Table 1.
Luring the prey
Olson et al. [11] introduces the theory of luring commu-
nication (LCT) based on grounded theory [13] to address
the process of entrapment used by child sexual predators
to lure their victims into an on-going sexual relationship
(Figure 2); this is believed to be very similar to strategies
used by rapist and stalkers [14].
They define the following phases which are of interest
here:
 Gaining Access: This is possible through strategic
placement of the predator, where they will have the
chance to have access to children;Table 2 Relationship between different types of predatory ch
Class Characteristics
Relation Stranger Acq
Label Grabbers Gro
Preferences Situational Pre
Strategic placement Short term Lon
Exclusivity More Non-exclusive Bot
Intensity Less Intense Inte
Persistence Less Persistence Pers
Dangerous to other children Yes Yes
Children they approach 1 to many 1 to
Individuals involved One-to-one, One-to-many One Cycle of Entrapment: the core of the cycle is
defined as deceptive trust development. The success
of a predator in luring a child depends on its ability
to build the trust. Oslon et al. [11] suggest that most
predators create the trust by strategically placing
themselves in authoritative position such as teachers,
priests or coaches and they will engaging in
relationship-building activities such as dating, buying
them gifts and showing them attention and affection
– Grooming: predator engages in sexually explicit
conversation to desensitise them in order to
secure the cooperation of the victim and reduce
risk of discovery or exposured [15].
– Isolation: predator tries to isolate their victim,
mentally and physically, from support networks;
e.g. friends, family/parents, and guardians
– Approach: the initial physical contact or verbal
lead-ins that occur prior to the actual sex act
This process is followed with Communicative Responses
to Sexual Acts that may, but may not, result in sexual
abuse.
Discussion
In this section, we briefly discussed definitions as relate
a clinical (paedophilia, hebephilia, ICD-10 and DSM-IV-
TR) and a legal (sexual offenders) interpretation of sex-
ual relationships with children. It is apparent that the
label ‘paedophile’ is widely used even if inconsistently
with related definitions. Further, that variations in na-
tional laws also leave room for interpretation. This is
certainly not an argument for such activities, but careless
use of such terms is not necessarily helpful in interpret-
ing such matters and in identifying the kinds of
approaches as are relevant to detection and prevention.
In considering the kinds of predatory behaviours in-
volved, we see that it takes intensity and persistence for a
predator to gain access and so to move from stranger toaracteristics
Discussed in
uaintance Family [10,11]
omers Granters [10,12]
ferential Both [10]
g term Long term [11]
h Both [2,5,6]
nse Intense [2,4,5]
istence Persistence [2,4,5]
Usually No [10]
many Usually one [10]
-to-one, One-to-many Usually one-to-one [10]
Figure 2 A model of luring communication theory.
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the four important aspects of the Cycle of Entrapment.
In the next section, we will discuss how the efforts previ-
ously needed to gain access are less in the online world,
and hint towards effective detection being best under-
take in the Cycle of Entrapment.Cyber-predators
Computer Mediated Communications (CMCs) and
Cyberspace undermine the traditional relationship be-
tween physical context and social situation. What is
introduced to provide users with new, easy and cheap
means to do things they used to do before also offers
new ways to commit old crimes - e.g. money launder-
ing, identity theft and child sexual abuse. In most
cases, moves online are accompanied by redefinition of
extant words such that a Facebook “friend” is some-
what different to a real friend, and “sharing”, “stalk-
ing”, and “grooming”, can have different interpretations
also [16,17].
Internet communication brings much autonomy: people
can be whoever, whatever and wherever they wish. The
downside is that such autonomy can be a ready cover for
vice. In the present context, it can be very easy for a preda-
tor to gain access to children in chat rooms to have a “pri-
vate chat” and become “friends” while, initially, hiding their
real intentions. Moreover, social networks make children
even more accessible, with their ease of posting of personal
information, including their location, also making it poten-
tially easier for predators to approach them [16]. If they in-
clude a stranger into their network, the transition to anacquaintance is already apparent – and there is also the pos-
sibility based on this to gain access to other acquaintances.
A YISS-2e survey, conducted on 1,500 youth Internet
uses (age 10 to 17) by the American National Center
for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) and the
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
(OJJDP) [18] on Online Victimization of Youth revealed
that [19]:
 13% (1 in 7) of youth has been exposed to unwanted
sexual solicitation online
– 4% asked them for nude or sexually explicit
photographs of themselves
– 14% of such solicitors were acquaintances
– 31% of such solicitors were aggressive - where
solicitors made or attempted to make offline
contact with youth
○ 75% of them asked to meet the youth in
person
○ 34% called youth on the telephone
○ 18% came to youth’s home
○ 12% gave youth money, gifts, or other items
○ 3% bought travel tickets for youth
 34% (1-3) were exposed to unwanted sexual
material; an increase of 9% over YISS-1f despite
increased use of filtering, blocking, and monitoring
software in households of youth Internet users (from
33% in YISS-1 to 55% YISS-2).
 9% (1 in 11) were harassed, with threatening or
other offensive behaviour
 34% communicated online with people they did not
know in person.
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they met online.
 Only 5% of solicitations and 9% of unwanted
exposures were reported to law enforcement,
Internet service providers, or other authorities.
Most of those affected do not have the digital skills
and knowledge to protect themselvesg and it appears
that law enforcement agencies also lack the resources to
address it. Organizations such as the Virtual Global
Taskforce (VGT) [20], the Child Exploitation and Online
Protection centre (CEOP) [21] and Internet Watch
Foundation (IWF) [22] in the UK, and many more, have
been created to address such problems, and even more
laws have been crafted such as EU Directive 2011/92/
EUh and UK acts such as Sexual Offence Act 2003 and
Children Act 2004. However, such laws assume predator
detection, without which enforcement will be difficult.
Such detection faces major challenges: (1) cyberspace
empowers the predators by ease of access; (2) access can
occur in private online settings; (3) law enforcement
agencies may not have access to these private online set-
tings; (4) the volume of communication in general is
large, and monitoring all of them for a relative few such
problems is non-trivial. Here, we address only (1) in how
cyberspace can empower the predators. Addressing (2)
and (3) would require technological considerations, and
(4) is a challenge of scale; all of these are beyond the
scope of this paper.
Empowering predators?
In the recent past, children would spend a lot of time
outside. Predators would need to approach these chil-
dren physically. Some might suggest that fears of such
predators have led to children now spending most of
their time indoors. Whilst indoors, these children have
ready access to social media. Ironically, this can increase
access to children, because:
 They no longer need to be physically present in a
certain location in order to contact children
 They can target more than one child at a time,
especially in chat rooms
 Cyberspace bypasses parental supervision
 There is the possibility to avoid eyewitnesses
 Predators can assume any persona - e.g. age, gender
and image - and craft elaborate and apparently
exciting stories as they wish
The real world places limits on time, space and com-
munications, where a person/predator can only be in
one place at one period of time having conversations
with people who share the same environment. Cyber-
space compresses all of these, providing predators withthe ability to have parallel conversations with children/
other predators in different places at the same time; giv-
ing possibilities for one-to-many solicitations. A further
complication in terms of space is that laws are still sup-
posed to respect geographies. Can an adult from Spain
be arrested for solicitation with a 15 year old girl from
Portugal - the age of consent at the time of writing was
13 in Spain and 16 in Portugal – and what if they meet
in Spain? How about an adult from Nevada and a 17
year old girl in any of the neighbouring states – age of
consent in Nevada is 16 while in neighbouring states is
18. Again, does it depend where they meet?
The predators are able to use the Internet in at least
four ways [23]: (1) to locate children; (2) to engage in
sexual communication with children (3) to exchange
materials; e.g. stories and child pornography (4) to com-
municate with others predators; e.g. for self-validation or
additional information. Related to these, Hall & Hall
[24] label predators as:
1. Stalkersi: approaching children in chat rooms in
order to get physical access to them
2. Cruisers: interested in inappropriate sexual
communication and file exchange with children but
not with an intention to meet them offline
3. Masturbators: watchers of child pornography
4. Swappers: trading information, stories and
pornography
Although all of the classes and factors mentioned
above may result in sexual victimisation of a child or a
criminal offence, it does not automatically follow that it
will. However, it would be undesirable to test such a
notion. In fact it would be desirable to detect the signals
irrespective of harm. It is apparent that predators may
be empowered in cyberspace, and so in the next section
we look at ways in which prevention and investigation
can be empowered.
Empowering investigators
Detection of predators, then, appears to become split
across (1) detection of child pornography and identifica-
tion of the people involved; creators, distributors,
websites, etc. and (2) detection of predators who are
attempting to meet children offline for sexual purposes
(Penna et al. [25]). The first may entail and require
investigation of prior offences, but the second also has a
goal of prevention. It is important also to highlight the
difference in (2) between merely detecting predatory
communications and identifying the perpetrator. Per-
haps the most effective way to affect an arrest of such
predators is the so-called “sting” in which law enforce-
ment officers, and even volunteers, are trained to pose
as children – usually in chat rooms. One such voluntary
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non-profit organization where the volunteers, imitating
children, attract predators. They claim to have helped to
convict 550 predators since 2004.
State-of-the-art
Since manual tracking is a labour intensive activity, soft-
ware that implements parental controls may help. But
this needs to be installed and appropriately configured
on all devices. Some software even claims to flag poten-
tial predators alongside cyber-bullies. For example, Net
Nanny [27] claims to have an “anti-predator phrase list”,
perhaps similar to that of ContentBarrier [28] which
apparently flags on phrases such as: “are you alone”; “be-
lieve me”; “can i see you”; “can we meet”; “come alone”.
Of course, such a detection approach will only work if
predators use these phrases specifically. Also, not every
parent is sufficiently technologically knowledgeable to use
the right software to prevent predators from gaining
access to their childj and one would have to wonder about
responsibility and legal liability in the event that a preda-
tor is not detected despite such software being deployed.
Each software installation would need to update such
lists regularly, leading to inconsistencies in what was de-
tectable each time. And this leads towards such detec-
tion being undertaken at the network layer by internet
service providers using similar natural language process-
ing tools and techniques for predatory language/keyword
profiling [29].
There have been various approaches taken to cyber-
predator detection, many using the dataset provided by
Perverted Justice. These approaches can be divided into:
 Group A: Distinguishing between predators and
victims/ children
 Group B: Identifying inappropriate chat-
conversations with victims/ children
 Group C: Identifying the grooming/ predator
Pendar [30] addresses Group A by removing stop-
words, generating word unigrams, bigrams and trigrams
and using a Support Vector Machine (SVM) and k-NN
to achieve an f-of 0.943. RahmanMiah et al. [31] address
Group B through three classes of chat: (i) Child
Exploitation: adult-child sexual conversation; (ii) Sexual
Fantasies: adult-adult sexually explicit conversation; (iii)
General: conversations with no sexual content. They
combine text categorisation, category information pro-
vided by LIWC (Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count)
and a Naïve Bayes classifier [32,33]. Unlike Pendar [30]),
they do not use pre-processing or spellchecking.
McGhee et al. [34] use a rule based approach and k-NN
- achieving 83% accuracy - for Group C, labelling con-
versations – partially similar to Olson et al. [11] as (i)Exchange of personal information; (ii) Grooming; (iii)
Approach; (iv) None of the above. Similarly for Group
C, Michalopoulos and Mavridis [35] used decision-
making methods and Naïve Bayes after removing stop-
words and applying a spelling correction strategy, to
achieve 96% accuracy, based on: (i) Gaining Access:
predators intention to gain access to the victim/child; (ii)
Deceptive Relationship: the deceptive relationship that
the predator tries to establish with the minor, as a pre-
liminary to a sexual attack (as mentioned in [10,11]) and
(iii) Sexual Affair: indicates the predator’s intention for
a sexual affair with the victim/ child.
Other related research tends towards variations on
these approaches; Bogdanova et al. [36] addresses both
predator and the conversation using psychological cues
and sentiment analysis approaches with Naïve Bayes;
Strapparava & Mihalcea [37], McGhee et al. [34], Argamon
et al. [38], etc. Peersman et al. [39] use the combination of
features from Lanning [10]) and McGhee et al. [34] to
create predator dictionaries and apply:
“… both a resampling and a filtering strategy. More
specifically, we trained a post-level classifier based on
a balanced subset and a classifier on the user level
based on a filtered subset of the training data .We
then combined the output of these two systems and im-
posed conversation-level constraints that significantly
improved the quality of the output.”
Research on topics related to detection of predators in
chat-logs includes:
 Detecting child pornography in peer-to-peer net-
works: e.g. Hughes et al. [16]
 Detecting conversation topic: e.g. Adams and
Martell [40]
 Detecting harassment: Yin et al. [41]
 Authorship Attribution: e.g. Juola [42]
 Authorship Profiling (detecting age and gender): e.g.
Peersman, Vaassen, Asch and Daelemans [39])
PAN 2012
In 2012, a workshop on “Uncovering Plagiarism, Author-
ship, and Social Software Misuse” (PAN) introduced the
challenge of Sexual Predator Identification. A set of chat
logs were provided for participating research teams
against which to evaluate systems. Two different tasks
were involved:
 Task 1: Identify the predators among all users in the
different conversations.
 Task 2: Identify the part (the lines) of the
conversations, which are the most distinctive of the
predator behaviour.
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world predatory scenarios amongst other (non-preda-
tory) exchangesk. This is a large collection (~358K lines)
with following properties:
 Few True Positives (real conversations with a
potential “predator”) - 4% only: selected from chat-
logs provided on the Perverted Justice Foundation
website (PJ) – which publishes logs of online conver-
sations between convicted predators and volunteers
posing as underage teenagers.
 Large number of potential False Positives (people
talking about sex or shared topic with the
“predator”). The organisers used Omegle [43]
repository - which presents a random sample of
more than 1 million anonymous conversations of
strangers – as it contains “abusive language and
general silliness online” and sometimes users “engage
in cybersex” [44].
 Large number of Negatives (general conversations).
Regular conversations collected from IRClog [45]
and Krinj [46].
Data are divided into Training and Testing sets, with
30% of the collection for Training comprising 66,927
conversations with no more than 150 lines each. 291 of
these 66,927 involved 142 unique predators. The Test
Corpus comprises 155,128 conversations with more than
150 lines each, 440 of which involve 254 unique preda-
tors (task 1). Table 3 below presents the details of the
created dataset.
The data are presented in XML as shown in Figure 3.
For Training, predator IDs were known (task 1) but
the predatory elements of the chat were not identified
(task 2). For the latter, the organisers assessed 113,888
lines submitted by participants and identified 6478 that
they considered demonstrated predatory behaviour.
Surrey detecting sexual predators at PAN12
We participated in this PAN challenge [47] to explore
the patterns of offender behaviour. Having neverTable 3 Properties of the collection by data provider
PJ Omegle IRClog Krjin
#conversations 11350 267261 28501 50510
conv.length≤ 150 9076 265747 21896 48569
Training Set
conv. length≤ 150 2723 43064 6569 14571
Unique user (perverted) 291(142) 84131 10613 2660
Test Set
#conv.length ≤ 150 5321 100482 15327 33998
Unique user 440 (254) 196130 17788 4358attempted the analysis of such a corpus previously, our
approach – described below - was largely built around
heuristics relating to commonality of requests for key
personal information, with similarities in the type of re-
quest but variation in the wording of the request.
Samples selected from the training corpus showed that
the following four classes of information request ap-
peared to be common, and led us to produce sets of in-
dicators for accepting or rejecting passages (Table 4);
this offers the possibility to filter the chat logs to identify
potential predators.
 Address (Approach): Most ask for the address of the
house or somewhere nearby to travel to.
 Parents (Isolation): Questions about parents are
usually because of:
– Secrecy
○ Making sure children are unsupervised while
chatting
○ Making sure the chat history will be deleted
later
○ Saying nothing to their parents
– Seclusion
○ How isolated the child usually is? Relation
with family members
○ To determine whether parents are around
○ To ascertain how long they would be gone for
 Age (Deceptive Trust Development): Some predators
might lie about their age. Interestingly, most of
them can be quite open about their age. They would
usually highlight the fact that they are older, wishing
the child were older, the fact that they might end up
in a jail or trouble because of chatting with an
underage children and so on, and so an expectation
on the child to keep “Our Little Secret”.
 Activities (Grooming / Approach): References to
sexual activities. They usually focus more on the
concept of meeting and having fun, watching TV and
listening to music. But these conversations can be
shifted depending on the child’s age as in the chat
with adolescents the conversations are more explicit.
These classes correspond with the Cycle of Entrapment,
discussed earlier [11] which includes Deceptive Trust
Development, Grooming, Isolation, and Approach. We
note again, as before, that Deceptive Trust Development is
usually considered by reference to these other phases.
In the training corpus, there were phrases solely used
to emphasise this, e.g. “u know I would go to jail if some
on figures out”, “this is out little secret”, “I can get in
trouble talking to u”. In all of these, there is an attempt
to create a fake trust. We denote all phrases as belong-
ing to the “Age” class as most refer to the age difference.
We also consider some Activities to cover both
<conversation id="0042762e26ed295a8576806f5548cad9">
<message line="3">
<author>f069dbec9ab3e090972d432db279e3eb</author>
<time>03:20</time>
<text>whats up?</text>
</message>
...
<message line="10">
<author>f069dbec9ab3e090972d432db279e3eb</author>
<time>04:00</time>
<text>sse you llater?</text>
</message>
</conversation>
...
<conversation id="0209b0a30c8eced86863631ada73a530">
<message line="3">
<author>0042762e26ed295a8576806f5548cad9</author>
<time>01:17</time>
<text>and that i dont touch u</text>
</message>
</conversation>
Figure 3 Structure of the corpus data.
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identifies that seduction/grooming techniques for young
children revolve around fun, games and plays while for
older children it revolves around sexual arousal, curiosity,
rebelliousness and inexperience. On the other hand, Olson
et al. [11] identify Approach as “the initial physical contact
or verbal lead-ins that occur prior to the actual sex act.”
Hence, we labelled the Activity class as “Grooming/Ap-
proach” to fit both definitions, but retained Address in-
formation separately. Examples of phrases involved
(accept) in each information request, and exceptions
(reject) are shown in Table 4.
System design
The approach is relatively straightforward, was imple-
mented using a variety of (Linux) shell scripts, andTable 4 Contents of accept and reject classes
Categories Accept/reject size Samples of accept/reject content
Address Accept 13 Different spelling combination of following
Reject 78 IT and social networking related topics suc
Parents Accept 11 Different spelling combination of following
Reject 26 Reference to parents’ objects or characteris
Reference to technical terms such as “paren
Age Accept 11 Different spelling combination of following
Reject 33 Self-reference such as “I’m underage”
Reference to the others such as sister, brot
Excluding, “wish you were here /with me”
Activities Accept 6 Different spelling combination of followingappeared to offer good performance on the Training
Corpus (up to f1 of 0.66 for training). We removed the
XML markup and structured the data by Author ID and
Conversation ID as shown in Table 5. We did not use
any pre-processing of date information, and used the
chats as they were presented; including those where vol-
unteers posed as children (pseudo-victims).
The system algorithm is presented below by Table 6
and Figure 4.
Our process of Sexual Predator Identification can be
explained as:
1. For all the q ∈ Q, Store the Lines of the Corpus L
where the Text column TW includes words from
Accept List of one of the categories CXA and not C
X
R
in file Datawords: “your addres”, “ur addres”, “the addres”
h as URL address, Facebook address, email address, IP address
words: “your mom”, “your dad”, “your Parent”
tics such as “Ur dads car”, “Your mom is nice, young”
t class”
words: “you are young”, “get in trouble”, “underage”, “to jail”, “wish you were”
her, friend
words: “go down on you”, “make you come”
Table 5 Data structure after removing XML tags
Lines Conversation ID Message line Author ID Time Text
1 0042762e26ed2 3 f069dbec9ab3 03:20 whats up?
2 0042762e26ed2 10 f069dbec9ab3 04:00 sse you llater
3 0209b0a30c8ec 3 0042762e26ed 01:17 and that i dont touch u
Vartapetiance and Gillam Security Informatics 2014, 3:3 Page 10 of 19
http://www.security-informatics.com/content/3/1/32. For Task 1: Select the Unique (AuthorID) of the
authors whose count of occurrence was more than
or equal the defined Confidence Threshold
3. For Task 2: Select the Lines of the Corpus Data
where the count of Unique (AuthorID) is more than
the Threshold
Training approach
We tested all information request types (Categories) men-
tioned in Table 4 individually, varying the confidence
threshold (CT) required for a detection, and also in various
combinations. The results are presented in Table 7 that
shows the number of predatory lines “Flagged” per experi-
ment (task 2), the number of “Unique” predator IDs (task
1), the correct detections (True Positives, TP), incorrect
one (False Positives, FP) and False Negatives (FN), followed
by values for Precision, Recall and F1.
We could detect 113 out of 142 predators using two or
more occurrences of all four indicators (**). Moreover, we
tested each indicator individually - varying the number of
occurrences and in various combinations - to analyse the
importance of each. Although all four classes play an im-
portant role, the combination of two or more occurrences
of Parents and Address classes together correctly flagged
at least 105 predators; showing the information need in
these two.
Testing - competition results
For the Test Corpus, we used the combination of all four
categories that occurred twice or more, as this offered theTable 6 Table of notations
Symbol Meaning
Q Set of Queries
q A single query where q ∈ Q
L The single Line from the Corpus ∈{ConversattionID,
Message #, AuthorID, Time, TW}
AuthorID The unique ID for each Author presented in Author ID
column
TW The content presented in Text Column
C Set of Categories where C ∈ {Address, Parent, Age, Intention}
CX A single Category where X ∈ C
CXA , C
X
R C
X for Accept (A) and Reject files (R)
Threshold The Value defined as the confidence threshold for
flagging someone as predatoroptimal f1 score on the Training Corpus (precision = 0.7,
recall = 0.62 and F1 = 0.66). However, for test data this did
not perform as well (precision = 0.62, recall = 0.39 and F1 =
0.48) and it could be argued that for real detection the false
negatives would be of particular concern making focus on
recall rather more important than precision (Table 7, *).
Results suggest, then, that predators do use patterns
that would fit with the Cycle of Entrapment, so it may
be possible that such a system can generalise. However,
it also appears that accumulation of cues during conver-
sations is important. This finding, and others like it, are
perhaps not readily tested in the wild.Post competition evaluation
Our participation in PAN12 demonstrated that the chat
logs did indeed bear evidenced of Cycle of Entrapment
related communications, and our own post-competition
analysis highlighted the need for a more comprehensive
coverage of each aspect of the Cycle, not least of which
involves coverage of predatory chats that are more sexu-
ally explicit in Activities (Grooming / Approach).
Initially, we improved our approach through contrastive
frequency analysis, which increased the number of attri-
butes in each category to those shown in Table 8. This im-
proved the number of True Positives, and so the Recall.
Using a confidence threshold, we can increase the F1
score from 0.66 to 0.74 for Train, which would have
achieved an increase for F1 from 0.48 to just 0.52 for
Test. The Confidence threshold is, simply, a requirement
for 3 occurrences or more of predatory behaviour
(Table 9, row 6, 7 and 11, 12l). The best recall, i.e.
retrieving the majority of predatory conversations, could
be achieved absent such a threshold, with Recall
increased from 0.8 to 0.94 but with 683 False Positives
which might not be ideal for investigatory purposes
(Table 9, row 2); F1 gives us the trade-off.
To reduce False Positives, we looked to filtering based on:
1. Removing all conversations centred on computer-
related conversations. (135 additional attributes)
2. Removing sex chats which do not contain other Cycle
of Entrapment indications (47 additional attributes)
These two are significant distractors in the PAN2012
corpus (based on Sections PAN 2012). Filter 1 leads to an
increase in Precision, Recall and F1 (Table 9, row 7). Filter
Algorithm 
Figure 4 Algorithm of our system for PAN2013.
Table 7 Results of experiments
# of occurrence Flagged Unique TP FP FN Precision Recall F1
Address cues category
Once or more 159 117 58 59 84 0.5 0.41 0.45
Twice or more 74 33 28 5 114 0.85 0.20 0.32
Three times or more 18 9 8 1 134 0.89 0.06 0.11
Parents cues category
Once or more 440 255 84 172 58 0.33 0.59 0.42
Twice or more 257 72 49 24 93 0.68 0.35 0.46
Three times or more 151 38 32 6 110 0.84 0.23 0.36
Age cues category
Once or more 124 88 33 55 109 0.38 0.23 0.29
Twice or more 62 25 17 8 125 0.68 0.12 0.20
Three times or more 21 10 9 1 133 0.90 0.06 0.12
Intentions cues category
Once or more 39 35 14 21 128 0.40 0.10 0.16
Twice or more 8 5 4 1 138 0.80 0.03 0.05
Three times or more 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Combining two cue categories of address and parents
Once or more 598 333 105 228 37 0.32 0.74 0.44
Twice or more 366 101 74 27 68 0.73 0.52 0.61
Three times or more 217 53 46 7 96 0.87 0.32 0.47
Combining three cue categories of address, parents and age
Once or more 722 388 112 276 37 0.29 0.79 0.42
Twice or more 458 124 85 39 57 0.69 0.60 0.64
Three times or more 280 69 58 11 84 0.84 0.41 0.55
Combining all four
Once or more 761 410 113 297 29 0.28 0.80 0.41
** Twice or more 478 126 88 38 54 0.70 0.62 0.66
Three times or more 298 72 62 10 80 0.86 0.44 0.58
Test Corpus
* Twice or more 630 160 99 61 155 0.62 0.39 0.48
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Table 8 Comparing original and improved contents of accept and reject classes
Category Accept/reject attributes Class No. TP FP FN Precision Recall F1
Address
Original
Accept 13
58 59 84 0.5 0.41 0.45
Reject 78
Improved
Accept 27
92 202 50 0.31 0.65 0.42
Reject 82
Parent
Original
Accept 11
84 172 58 0.33 0.59 0.42
Reject 26
Improved
Accept 20
117 399 25 0.23 0.82 0.36
Reject 22
Age
Original
Accept 11
88 33 55 0.38 0.23 0.29
Reject 33
Improved
Accept 37
84 186 58 0.31 0.59 0.41
Reject 34
Activities
Original
Accept 6
35 14 21 0.40 0.10 0.16
Reject 0
Improved
Accept 51
61 132 81 0.32 0.43 0.36
Reject 20
Overall
Original
Accept 41
113 297 29 0.28 0.80 0.41
Reject 137
Improved
Accept 135
134 683 8 0.16 0.94 0.28
Reject 296
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ter some of the sexually explicit predatory chats as well
(Table 9, row 8, 9), so require further adaptation. The
computer-related conversations filter offered greatest
promise.Table 9 Results for improvements on our PAN2012 approach
Filter Categories CT TP
Results from Train Corpus based on highest recall
1. Original All 4 1 113
2. Improved -no Filter All 4 1 134
3. Computer All 4 1 131
4. Sex All 4 1 130
5. Combined All 4 1 127
Results from Train Corpus based on highest F1
6. Original All 4 2 88
7. Improved - no Filter All 4 3 114
8. Computer All 4 3 111
9. Sex All 4 3 99
10. Combo All 4 3 98
Results from Test Corpus based on highest F1
11. Original All 4 2 99
12. Computer All 4 3 115Investigating the possible gain from machine
learning
Such an approach, whilst supported by theory, has been
criticised as “Too Simplistic” for not using machine
learning approaches for detection. However, we argueFP FN Precision Recall F1
294 29 0.28 0.8 0.41
683 8 0.16 0.94 0.28
529 11 0.2 0.92 0.33
540 12 0.19 0.92 0.32
399 15 0.24 0.89 0.38
38 54 0.7 0.62 0.66
53 28 0.68 0.8 0.74
34 31 0.77 0.78 0.77
47 43 0.68 0.7 0.69
30 44 0.77 0.69 0.73
61 155 0.62 0.39 0.48
57 139 0.67 0.45 0.54
Less data set specific More data set specific
pic <= 3.189815
|   sexy <= 0: False (57.0/1.0)
|   sexy > 0: True (3.0/1.0)
pic > 3.189815
|   busy <= 0: False (2.0)
|   busy > 0: True (4.0)
com <= 0
|   is <= 0: False (2.0)
|   is > 0
|   |   might <= 4.591761: True (16.0)
|   |   might > 4.591761
|   |   |   a <= 4.941794: False (2.0)
|   |   |   a > 4.941794: True (2.0)
com > 0: False (5.0)
Figure 5 Sample of attributes selected by Weka and decision tree made using them.
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there is a strong theory underlying it or if it leads to the-
ory generation. Otherwise, as is too often seen, results
lack explanationm. In this section, we address the poten-
tial for machine learning to:
1. Improve detection based on our approach
2. Produce results independent of our approach, which
might subsequently be interpreted with respect to
theory.
We use the popular Java-based Weka software, from the
University of Waikato, with default settings for each approach
-if not otherwise mentioned, to evaluate this potential.
A decision tree for attributes: J48 classifier
As a first step, we let the Weka select attributes (using
StringToWordVector, using 500 word fields and TF-
IDF), and use the J48 classifier to identify suitable deci-
sion (TF-IDF) values for chat conversations per author
(both with and without any pre-processing or filtering).Table 10 J48 classifier’s results
Experiment Leave Size TP
Results from Train Model
1. Raw data per Author 40 79 73
2. Categories 11 21 86
3. Occurrences 3 5 10
4. Categories & Occurrences 10 19 10
Results from applying Train Model on test
5. Categories 11 21 10
6. Occurrences 3 5 11
7. Categories & Occurrences 10 19 10
Results from Test Model
8. Categories 9 17 92
9. Occurrences 3 5 11
10. Categories & Occurrences 4 7 93We observe for this approach that (1) there is no im-
provement over our approaches (Table 9, row 8). (2)
Branching values are very specific and may cause diffi-
culties for generalisation (Figure 5).
A decision tree for categories: J48 classifier
The J48 classifier was next tested against classes ex-
tracted following computer conversation filtering, using
three approaches:
1. Categories only: A profile of author based on the
categories and related class (predator, or not) was
created. For Train, this resulted in a tree with 11
leaves and size of 21, which achieved an F1 of 0.67
(Table 10, row 2).
2. Occurrences only: Since predatory chats might
extend across many conversation lines, and not all of
the categories might be satisfied, there might be
enough occurrences still to classify it as predatory
chat. Therefore, we consider the total number of
occurrences of attributes in each categories (Sum)FP FN Precision Recall F1
56 69 0.57 0.51 0.54
28 56 0.75 0.60 0.67
3 32 39 0.76 0.73 0.74
4 25 38 0.81 0.73 0.77
1 33 153 0.75 0.40 0.52
5 57 139 0.67 0.45 0.54
2 33 152 0.76 0.40 0.52
20 162 0.82 0.36 0.50
5 57 139 0.67 0.45 0.54
22 161 0.81 0.37 0.50
Train (leaves = 10 , size = 19) Test (leaves = 4 , size = 7)
Sum <= 1: No (97476.0/23.0)
Sum > 1
|   Sum <= 2: No (63.0/8.0)
|   Sum > 2
|   |   Sum <= 6
|   |   |   Address <= 0
|   |   |   |   Sum <= 4
|   |   |   |   |   Age <= 0: No (6.0)
|   |   |   |   |   Age > 0
|   |   |   |   |   |   Parents <= 0
|   |   |   |   |   |   |   Age <= 2: Yes (3.0/1.0)
|   |   |   |   |   |   |   Age > 2: No (6.0)
|   |   |   |   |   |   Parents > 0: Yes (7.0/2.0)
|   |   |   |   Sum > 4: Yes (12.0/2.0)
|   |   |   Address > 0
|   |   |   |   Address <= 4: Yes (56.0/11.0)
|   |   |   |   Address > 4: No (3.0)
|   |   Sum > 6: Yes (52.0/3.0)
Parents <= 0: No (218163.0/130.0)
Parents > 0
|   Age <= 0
|   |   Address <= 0: No (430.0/34.0)
|   |   Address > 0: Yes (29.0/6.0)
|   Age > 0: Yes (75.0/8.0)
Figure 6 Different decision trees for categories & occurrences experiment, train vs test.
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shown in (Table 7, row 3), have number of
occurrences only improves the F1 value to 0.74
3. Categories and Occurrences: A combination of 1
and 2. As shown in (Table 10, row 4,), results equal
those already obtained by our improved approach
(Table 9, row 8)ble 11 Naïve and Multinomial Naïve Bayes classifiers’ resul
Filter Stopwords filter Attributes selection
ïve Bayes, Unigram
No Filter No No – 703
No Filter No Yes – 569
No Filter Yes No – 764
No Filter Yes Yes – 572
Computer No No – 654
Computer No Yes – 576
Computer Yes No – 654
Computer Yes Yes – 586
ultinomial Naïve Bayes, Unigram
No Filter No No – 703
. No Filter No Yes – 569
. No Filter Yes No – 764
. No Filter Yes Yes – 572
. Computer No No – 654
. Computer No Yes – 576
. Computer Yes No – 654
. Computer Yes Yes – 586
ïve Bayes Applied to Accept file (improved) Approach
. Computer NA No – 136
. Computer NA Yes – 103
ultinomial Naïve Bayes Applied to Accept file (improved) Approach
. Computer NA No – 136
. Computer NA Yes – 103We used the classification models developed from the
Train Corpus on the Test Corpus, resulting in an F1of
0.54 for “Occurrences only”. To quickly evaluate the
ability to generalise, we used J48 on Test, and assessed
tree similarity (Figure 6); however, this did not indicate
how to improve F1 for Test using Train and did not im-
prove Test results (Table 10, row 6,9 vs Table 9, row 12).tst
TP FP FN Pre. Recall F1
137 4909 5 0.3 0.96 0.05
137 5773 5 0.2 0.97 0.05
136 5218 6 0.03 0.96 0.05
136 6270 6 0.02 0.96 0.04
137 5992 5 0.02 0.96 0.04
137 6127 5 0.02 0.97 0.04
136 6537 6 0.02 0.96 0.04
136 6710 6 0.02 0.96 0.04
138 1465 4 0.09 0.97 0.16
137 911 5 0.13 0.96 0.23
139 2161 3 0.06 0.98 0.11
138 1166 4 0.11 0.97 0.19
137 713 5 0.16 0.96 0.28
137 623 5 0.18 0.96 0.30
138 952 4 0.13 0.97 0.22
137 831 5 0.14 0.96 0.25
91 76 51 0.54 0.64 0.59
91 76 51 0.54 0.64 0.59
13 3 129 0.81 0.09 0.16
11 4 131 0.73 0.08 0.14
Table 12 Sample of attribute probabilities defined by best scored Multinomial Naïve Bayes classifier
Attributes False True Diff. Attributes False True Diff.
ok 0.0051 0.0065 0.0014 i 0.0162 0.0051 -0.0111
to 0.0111 0.0057 -0.0054 you 0.0143 0.0037 -0.0106
get 0.0034 0.0056 0.0022 u 0.0120 0.0043 -0.0077
be 0.0044 0.0055 0.0011 a 0.0119 0.0040 -0.0080
me 0.0081 0.0055 -0.0025 m 0.0113 0.0008 -0.0105
want 0.0041 0.0053 0.0012 to 0.0111 0.0057 -0.0054
call 0.0011 0.0053 0.0042 hi 0.0110 0.0007 -0.0103
if 0.0044 0.0052 0.0008 asl 0.0099 0.0000 -0.0099
when 0.0023 0.0052 0.0029 hey 0.0096 0.0016 -0.0080
so 0.0069 0.0051 -0.0018 the 0.0095 0.0046 -0.0050
i 0.0162 0.0051 -0.0111 and 0.0095 0.0045 -0.0050
will 0.0027 0.0051 0.0023 it 0.0091 0.0051 -0.0040
it 0.0091 0.0051 -0.0040 f 0.0084 0.0002 -0.0082
can 0.0052 0.0050 -0.0003 are 0.0084 0.0031 -0.0053
on 0.0059 0.0049 -0.0010 is 0.0083 0.0038 -0.0045
do 0.0079 0.0048 -0.0031 what 0.0081 0.0047 -0.0035
see 0.0033 0.0048 0.0015 me 0.0081 0.0055 -0.0025
would 0.0026 0.0048 0.0022 do 0.0079 0.0048 -0.0031
just 0.0053 0.0047 -0.0006 my 0.0076 0.0041 -0.0035
lol 0.0054 0.0047 -0.0007 have 0.0071 0.0047 -0.0024
Vartapetiance and Gillam Security Informatics 2014, 3:3 Page 15 of 19
http://www.security-informatics.com/content/3/1/3This experiment did, however, suggest: (i) it is not ne-
cessary to expect a specific category in detection; (ii)
dataset difference impacts performance; (iii) a system
relying on such an approach may obtain worse results.
Naïve and Multinomial Naïve Bayes classifiers
Classifiers such as Naïve Bayes and Multinomial Naïve
Bayes were suggested for such a machine learning evalu-
ation. Naive Bayes calculates the probability of having a
feature (attribute) given a class; Multinomial Naïve Bayes
considers these features as independent variables. For
Predator Identification, we are interested in co-occurrences
of attributes and independence is unclear. Weka helpfully
provides Java classes to simplify the transformation of data
to a suitable form for analysis with same parameters as J48.
We evaluate the effects of (shown in Table 11):
1. Computer based conversation filter only (column 2, Filter)Table 13 Sample of attribute probabilities defined by Naïve B
Attributes False True Difference
ur mom 0.0021 0.9968 0.9947
sweetie 0 0.8369 0.8369
your mom 0.0013 0.7356 0.7343
in trouble 0.0007 0.417 0.4163
ur dad 0.0007 0.4161 0.41542. Including and excluding stopwordsn (column 3,
Stopwords Filter)
3. Attribute Selection using Information Gain based on
the rank values of zero and more (column 4,
Attributes Selection)
Experiments involved both unigrams and trigramso for
attribute selection. Trigrams were selected to seek a bal-
ance between attributes chosen by Weka and those we
had manually selected. For Naïve Bayes, results for tri-
grams were marginally better than for unigrams – 0.01
– but selected attributes show preference for unigrams -
51 trigrams, 256 bigrams and 413 unigrams).
Although these results are not particularly illuminating
or performative –they bear similarity with those seen for
at least one other PAN12 participantp - it is worth look-
ing to the attributes and probabilities as relate to the
classification. Table 12 shows attributes, probability ofayes classifier applied on accept file of our approach
Attributes False True Difference
ur mum 0.0006 0 −0.0006
your mum 0.0006 0 −0.0006
you are so young 0.0001 0 −0.0001
much young 0.0001 0 −0.0001
in troble 0 0 0
Table 15 Sample of attribute weights assessed by SMO
Predatory words Non-predatory words
Weight Attribute Weight Attribute
0.32 yes −0.08 yep
0.30 mmm −0.09 umm
0.20 hello −0.06 hey
0.08 ya −0.06 yo
0.08 aww −0.20 awww
Table 14 SMO classifiers’ results
Filter Stopwords filter Attributes Selection TP FP FN Pre. Recall F1
SVM, Unigram
1. No Filter No No – 703 110 16 32 0.87 0.77 0.82
2. No Filter No Yes – 569 106 16 36 0.87 0.75 0.80
3. No Filter Yes No – 764 99 15 43 0.86 0.70 0.77
4. No Filter Yes Yes – 572 98 17 44 0.85 0.70 0.76
5. Computer No No – 654 113 11 29 0.91 0.80 0.85
6. Computer No Yes – 576 114 10 28 0.92 0.80 0.86
7. Computer Yes No – 654 106 12 36 0.90 0.75 0.82
8. Computer Yes Yes – 586 106 12 36 0.90 0.75 0.82
SVM, Trigram
9. No Filter No No – 743 104 17 38 0.86 0.73 0.79
10. No Filter No Yes – 639 104 16 38 0.87 0.73 0.79
11. No Filter Yes No – 783 106 13 36 0.89 0.75 0.81
12. No Filter Yes Yes – 648 105 13 37 0.89 0.74 0.81
13. Computer No No – 720 107 12 35 0.90 0.75 0.82
14. Computer No Yes – 602 104 13 38 0.89 0.73 0.80
15. Computer Yes No – 758 102 11 40 0.90 0.72 0.80
16. Computer Yes Yes – 648 105 13 38 0.89 0.74 0.81
SVM Applied on Accept file of our Approach
17. Computer NA No – 136 61 10 81 0.86 0.43 0.57
18. Computer NA Yes – 103 61 10 81 0.86 0.43 0.57
Results from Applying SVM Train Model on Test
19. Computer NA No – 654 162 8 92 0.95 0.64 0.76
20. Computer NA Yes – 576 158 9 96 0.95 0.62 0.75
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tor), probability for True (Predator), and the difference
(positive values imply True) in two different columns
sorted by True and False values respectively. Of the 40
attributes in the table, 34 (excluding ‘ok’, ‘call’ and ‘lol’ on
the left and ‘hi’, ‘asl’ and ‘hey’ on the right) are members
of a well-known stoplist generated for Information Re-
trieval from the Brown corpusq.
Of interest for Deception Detection theorists would be
the relationship between first person singular pronouns
(underlined in the Table 12) and predatory conversations.
Deception Detection theory suggests a reduction in use of
first person singular pronoun by those attempting to de-
ceive; as a means of distancing self from deceptionr.
Although results appear disappointing, applying the
same approach to our 136 accept attributes enables us to
verify their value. For computer-filtered conversations (no
selection), we find 4 attributes have small negative values
and 28 have a zero probability (Table 11, row 17, 18).
These cover possible typos/misspellings that we have in-
cluded to offer coverage for a Test Corpus knowing that
Train is only a possible sample. Deleting all attributes with
non-positive values does not change the outcome, so theyare at least not harmful to the approach. Table 13 shows
the top 5 True and top 5 False attributes.
As Table 13 indicates, there is a big difference between
those attributes indicating predators and those offering
negative evidence. However, these sets do offer up varia-
tions of potential interest between ‘mom’ and ‘mum’,
‘trouble’ and ‘troble’.
Support vector machine: SMO classifier
SVMs have been shown to “consistently achieve good
performance on text categorization tasks”, and have
been demonstrated to outperform various other approa-
chess. To understand what is possible if using SVM, we
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as for Naïve Bayes and Multinomial Naïve Bayes.
In most cases, results were either equal to or better
than those from any of the previous experiments. Best
results were achieved for attributes selected from com-
puter conversation filtered dataset with stopwords not
removed (Table 14, row 6).
Table 15, shows a set of words identified by SMO
(stopwords included) and their related effect.
Use of SVM improved results dramatically. However,
Table 16 shows some of the attributes which result in
high scores being produced, where “aww” is considered
to be predatory but “awww” is not. It would seem pecu-
liar to suggest that predators rely on a shared style
guide, and yet this would be one simple theory that
could be derived from such an analysis.
The preponderance of stopwords in Table 12 brings
about one final question regarding the extent of their in-
fluence. We tested for this by removing all but stop-
words from all computer filtered chats and running
SVM over these data. Results (F1, 0.58) seem to indicate
that stopwords alone could be used to some extent for
predator detection, which would outperform a number
of other tested approaches in PAN2012. How meaning-
ful such a result is, and what it can tell us about the
conversations in general and the machine learning ap-
proaches in particular, remains to be understood.
Of the machine learning approaches attempted, SVM
leads to the best result, which outperforms our approach
and based on results here could indicatively have offered
4th place in the PAN2012 competition compared to the
9th achievable through post-competition improvements.
This is unsurprising: competition participants who fea-
tured in 1st, 3rd (2nd unreported) and 4th all used SVM.
However, it is important also to evaluate the basis for
performance. If we think of the features derived by SVM
as correlations from attributes to a binary classification,
we can then judge whether attributes would generallyTable 16 Top 10 attribute probabilities from each class define
Predatory words
Weight Attribute Weight Attribute
0.89 ok 0.52 were
0.77 call 0.52 there
0.68 hun 0.48 address
0.65 leave 0.48 u
0.65 soon 0.47 mind
0.59 sweetie 0.47 older
0.57 pm 0.46 very
0.54 hour 0.43 tight
0.52 around 0.43 going
0.52 right 0.42 suremake sense in such a correlation. Further, we can con-
sider how such attributes would relate to a theory such
as that of the Cycle of Entrapment and whether we
would expect correlation values to remain stable. More-
over, in this particular scenario, we could consider
whether such a correlation might offer sound evidence
for judicial purposes. Whilst use of the word ‘address’
fits to our theory (in the right context), it is more diffi-
cult to suggest a theoretical basis upon which the words
‘were’, ‘call’ and ‘there’ would be predatory indicators.
The question still remains whether or not we can eas-
ily explain the reasons that would underlie a detection,
not least so that it is readily possible to reason over any
false detection, which in reality might have a devastating
effect on an innocent person.
Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we have presented our understanding of
paedophilia and related issues of hebephilia and sexual
offences against children, and through these to under-
standing what would be detectable in the predatory ac-
tivities as might precede these. In discussing the clinical
and legal perspectives on these matters, we noted how
variation in age is a feature and that mainstream use of
such labels can be inconsistent with such definitions.
We noted that predatory activities tend to involve a
degree of effort on the part of the predator, and that the
Cycle of Entrapment is where such effort may be fo-
cussed. In extending our discussion to the online world,
we noted implications for the Cycle of Entrapment and
the difficulties of applying technological controls and
also of how the blurring of geographies can create issues,
and ways in which predators can use the online world.
We also discussed technologies that can be deployed
against such predators, as well as our own approach to
detection which accounts for the identification of re-
quests for information from children that would relate
to the Cycle of Entrapment, and approaches which wered by SMO classifier
Non-predatory words
Weight Attribute Weight Attribute
−0.65 f −0.45 thought
−0.53 they −0.44 stuff
−0.52 kewl −0.43 long
−0.52 nice −0.42 tired
−0.50 email −0.42 my
−0.49 which −0.42 means
−0.48 omg −0.41 idk
−0.46 cuz −0.41 bed
−0.46 a −0.38 ve
−0.46 like −0.38 waiting
Vartapetiance and Gillam Security Informatics 2014, 3:3 Page 18 of 19
http://www.security-informatics.com/content/3/1/3geared to improving our own system and evaluating it
against other approaches.
Children are often more skilled in their use of social
media and general ICT than parents, but likely less
adept at identifying suspicious behaviour or appropri-
ately assessing the risks from their interactions. Deter-
mined predators are likely to use all possible devices at
their disposal to satisfy their needs, whilst defences against
these are at present likely to be minimal. This asymmetry
makes social media and related online activities into a rich
hunting ground for these predators, with lawmakers and
enforcers always trying to keep up. Detection of any kind,
appropriately deployed, as can make the tasks of such
predators rather more difficult again will begin to address
this asymmetry and help make the online world a safer
place for children of any age.Endnotes
aWe have emphasised the term prepubescent, and will
refer back to this later.
bAs above.
cE.g. [48].
dNational Criminal Intelligence Service, UK Threat As-
sessment of Serious and Organised Crime, Paedophile
Crime Including Online Child Abuse. 2002, National
Criminal Intelligence Service.
eWolak et al. [19].
f Finkelhor et al., [49].
gBased on EU Kid report only 56% can change privacy
settings on a social networking profile, and 51% can
block junk mails and spam [50].
hDirective 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating
the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and
child pornography, and replacing Council Framework
Decision 2004/68/JHA.
iCyber-stalking is recognised as an offence that can be
prosecuted under a range of existing legislation (such as
the UK Protection from Harassment Act, 1997).
jFor more information and statistics please check
[19,49,50].
kSee Inches & Crestani [51] for further detail related
to creation of the Dataset.
lValues differ to those presented on the PAN2012
website due to organisers uses F0.5 which puts emphasis
on Precision over Recall. We would consider a better
system as one able to detect more suspects, hence our
discussion tends to draw attention to Recall values. As a
compromise, we only present F1 values.
mSpinning the Election (Skillicorn and Little) “We do
not yet completely understand these models of word use,
so the results should be taken with a grain of salt [52].”
nStopwords list extracted from [53].oIn Weka, n-grams include lower values for n, so
trigrams covers bigrams and unigrams also.
pSee participant run for gomezhidalgo12-2012-06-15-1
in Inches & Crestani [51].
qA list of 421 words produced from the Brown Corpus
as described by Fox [54].
rWe have addressed this in greater detail in [55], sec-
tion Relationship with victims (Children).
sThorsten [56].
tTables from the trigram experiments have not been
presented as they did not produce an effect on the
results.
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